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IN WAKE OF MANDOLIDIS: A CASE STUDY OF
RECENT TRIALS BROUGHT UNDER THE
MANADOLIDIS THEORY-COURTS ARE
GRAPPLING WITH PROCEDURAL
UNCERTAINTIES AND JURIES ARE AWARDING
EXORBITANT DAMAGES FOR PLAINTIFFS
Four years ago, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
decided Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,' drastically altering Workmen's Compensation Law in West Virginia. The decision which consolidated three cases2 concerned the primary issue
of the liability of an employer, covered under the State Workmen's
Compensation Act, to his employee.3 The court held that under
the Act an employer is subject to common law tort action for
damages or for wrongful death when the employer commits an
intentional tort or engages in willful, wanton and reckless
misconduct.4
* I would like to thank all of the attorneys who provided information to
me, without which I would not have been able to write this paper. Special thanks
go to Michael Victorson, Associate, Love, Wise, Robinson & Woodroe, Charleston,
West Virginia.
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
2 The three cases consolidated for the purpose of review were Mandolidis
v. Elkins Industries, Inc., Snodgrass v. United States Steel Corp., Dishmon v.
Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. Id.
In Mandolidis, the plaintiff lost two fingers and part of his right hand on
a table saw he was operating which did not have a safety guard. The plaintiff
alleged that the employer refused to install a proper safety guard on the saw
knowing that it was a violation of safety laws; that the employer knew the consequences of operating the saw without a guard because employees had been injured before, and that the employer ordered his employees to operate the saw
without a guard or be fired. The employee alleged that these acts by the employer
constituted willful and intentional misconduct. Id. at 914-15.
In Snodgrass, four employees were injured and one was killed when a metal
cable dislodged a wooden platform on which the men were standing and caused
them to fall nearly twenty-five feet into an excavation. The plaintiffs alleged that
the employer failed to provide a safe place to work, that the employer failed
to warn the plaintiffs of the danger, and the employer violated several state and
federal safety laws. The plaintiffs here also alleged that such conduct was willful
and intentional. Id. at 916-17.
In Dishmon, the suit was brought by the decedent of an employee who was
killed in a mine slatefall. The widow alleged that the defendant deliberately, willfully and wantonly allowed employees to work in conditions that violated state and
federal safety laws. Id. at 919-20.
2 Id. at 914.
'Id.
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The basis of Workmen's Compensation Law is to provide the
workman with automatic benefits regardless of fault if his injuries
are work-connected while protecting the employer from common
law suits by the employee. Indeed, the system is mutually advantageous for the employer and the employee. In the United States,
the employer alone contributes to the fund from which employee
benefits are paid (the employee and the government contribute
nothing)5 and in return the employee and his dependents give up
their common law right to sue for damages for any injury covered
by the act.' The social philosophy of the law is that the fund compensates the employee for work-related injuries while the employer
passes the cost to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product. 7 Insofar as the employer is concerned,
his costs of doing business are stabilized and decreased in the
long run, because he is not subject to high common law tort
damages.
However, under most Workmen's Compensation Acts, including the West Virginia Act, the employer's immunity from common law suit by his employee is not absolute. In West Virginia
there are two exceptions to this immunity. First, an employer
who in any way fails to provide compensation coverage is liable
to the employee for all damages suffered by reason of personal
injuries sustained in the course of employment.' In addition, the
employer in this situation cannot avail himself of the defenses of
fellow servant, assumption of the risk or contributory negligence.'
The second exception to employer immunity under the Act
I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION S 1.20 (desk ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as LARSON]. In West Virginia, unlike the majority of states, the employer must either
qualify as a self insurer or must subscribe to the state workmen's compensation
fund. An employer cannot choose a private company to insure his business. W.
VA. CODE S 23-2-5 (1981 Replacement Vol.). One qualifies as a self insurer by petitioning the West Virginia Compensation Commission and proving that he has
sufficient financial assets to insure himself. See W. VA. CODES 23-2-9 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
6 LARSON, supra note 5, at 5 1.10. In West Virginia, an employer contributing
to the state workmen's compensation fund is immune from common law damages
for the injury or death of an employee. W. VA. CODE S 23-2-6 (1981 Replacement
Vol.).
LARSON, supra note 5, at S 2.20.
W. VA. CODE S23-2-8 (1981 Replacement Vol.) An employer may fail to provide compensation coverage by refusing to subscribe to the fund, defaulting in
payments to the fund, or not complying with all the provisions relating to self
insurers under W. VA. CODE S 23-2-9 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
9 W. VA. CODE S 23-2-8 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
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in West Virginia occurs when an employer intentionally injures
his employee. In such a situation, should injury to or death of
an employee result, Article 4, section 2 (hereinafter 5 23-4-2) of
the Act grants the employee or his survivors a cause of action
against the employee for damages at common law in excess of
the amount of workmen's compensation benefits. 10 More
specifically:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate
intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the
employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the
employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter,
and shall also have a cause of action against the employer, as
if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages
over the amount received or receivable under this chapter."
In Mandolidis, the employees based their common law action
12
against their employers on this exception.
The significance of the supreme court's decision lies specifically
in its interpretation of the requisite behavior of the employer
necessary to remove his immunity, under § 23-4-2. Justice McGraw,
writing for the court, held that the employer loses his immunity
from common law actions "where such employer's conduct constitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton and reckless
misconduct."' 3 The court defined such conduct as action "undertaken with a knowledge and an appreciation of the high degree
of risk of harm to another ... [and a finding of] liability will require a strong probability that harm will result."" Moreover, the
court noted that proof that an employer knowingly failed to obey
safety laws would serve as evidence that the employer acted with
a knowledge and appreciation of risk of harm created by that
course of conduct." Since the court failed to distinguish an intentional failure to heed safety violations from a negligent failure,
"

W. VA. CODE

§ 23-4-2 (1981 Replacement Vol.).

I Id.

,I In its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals determined that the plain-

tiffs' claim in each of the three consolidated cases presented genuine issues of
material fact concerning the deliberate intent of the employer under 5 23-4-2.

Therefore, the court held that the cases were not subject to summary dismissal,
246 S.E.2d at 916-21. The court thus reversed the lower courts in Mandolidis
and Snodgrasswhich had granted motions for summary judgment and the lower

court in Dishmon which had granted a judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 907.
,"246 S.E.2d at 914. (citation omitted).
14

Id.

11Id. at 914 n. 10.
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it further muddled the distinction between intentional and
negligent conduct necessary to remove the immunity bar."6
Before Mandolidis, the requisite behavior on the part of the
employer necessary to remove the immunity under § 23-4-2 was
interpreted to require, at a minimum, specific intent. In Allen v.
Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., the court held that an employee
seeking damages from his employer for work-related injury must
show a specific intent on the part of the employer to injure him.
In overruling Allen, the supreme court in Mandolidis ignored the
strong basis upon which Allen rested.18 Further, the jurisdictions
from which the West Virginia Legislature adopted S 23-4-2, interpret that section as requiring proof of specific intent before the
employer can loose his immunity. 9 Moreover, the expert in the
16

Id. at 912.

"7Allen, 117 W. Va. 631, 636-37, 186 S.E. 612 (1936).
8 The specific intent requirement in Allen was not inconsistent with the
standard set forth two years earlier in Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115
W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934). In that case the court stated that "Gross negligence
is not tantamount to 'deliberate intention' to inflict injury." Id. at 253, 175 S.E.
at 72. The specific intent requirement was reaffirmed in a 1976 case. Eisnaugle
v. Booth, 226 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1976).
" In Washington, the statute for an action against an employer for deliberate
intention reads:
If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention
of his employer to produce such injury or death, the workman, the widow,
the widower, child, or dependent of the workman shall have the privilege
to take under this title and also have a cause of action against the
employer as if this title had not been enacted, for any excess of damages
over the amount received or receivable under this act.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 51.24.020. For Washington cases that have interpreted
deliberate intent to require specific intent on the part of the employer see Higley
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 13 Wash. App. 269, 534 P.2d 596 (1975); Biggs v. Donovan
Corkery Logging Co., 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d 235 (1936); Perry v. Beverage, 121
Wash. 652, 209 P. 1102 (1922; In Perry, the Washington court held that where
a foreman strikes an employee on the face with a water jug, the injury is within
the statute.
In Oregon the statute for an action against an employer for deliberate intention reads:
If injury or death results to a worker from the deliberate intention of
his employer to produce such injury or death, the worker, the widow,
widower, child or dependent of the worker may take under ORS 656.001
to 656.794, and also have cause for action against the employer as if
such statutes had not been passed, for damages over the amount payable
under those statutes.
OR. REV. STAT. S 656.156(2). Oregon also requires specific intent in order to remove
the employer's immunity from suit. See Caline v. Maede, 239 Or. 239, 396 P.2d
694 (1964); Heikkila v. Ewen Transfer Co., 135 Or. 631, 297 P. 373 (1931); Jenkins
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field, Larson, has stated that willful misconduct by the employer
falls short of the actual intention needed to remove the employer's
protection under the Act." Thus by lowering the standard
necessary to remove the employer's immunity from a specific intent to willful, wanton and reckless conduct, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals ignored legal treatises and several
years of precedent not only in West Virginia but in those states
from which the legislature adopted § 23-4-2.
Reaction to Mandolidis was widespread. The plaintiffs' bar
initially felt Mandolidis type suits were untouchable. Their concern was that even with the changed standard, whatever damages
awarded under § 23-4-2 would be subject to an offset by those
funds "received or receivable" under the Workmen's Compensation Act." To overcome this offset would require a high verdict.
Defense counsel reacted more vituperatively. A 1978 article,
published in this review, attacked the Mandolidis decision on
several grounds.' The authors concluded that the court's opinion
went against the clear intent of the West Virginia legislature; 23
failed to adequately articulate the willful, wanton and reckless
standard;24 would not be clearly understood and correctly applied
by juries;2 and would open a floodgate of litigation creating great
26
employer liability.
In his dissent in Mandolidis, Justice Neely voiced some of
these same concerns.' He felt that the court was "legislating"
v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 155 P. 703 (1916).
Employer conduct that goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such elements as knowlingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely
dangerous job, or willfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, this
still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the
injury of accidental character.
LARSON, supra note 5 at § 68.10 [citation omitted].
2, Telephone conversation with John Cooper.
Flannery, Beeson, Bradley and Goddard, The Expanding Role of the West

VirginiaSupreme Court ofAppeals in the Review of Workmen's CompensationAppeals, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1978).
1 Id. at 12. The authors aptly point to the failure of eleven attempts in the
West Virginia Legislature to reduce the deliberate intention standard to require
only a showing of willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct.
24 Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.

Id. at 16.
Mandolidis, 245 S.E.2d at 923-24 (Neely, J., dissenting).
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and that the issue of statutory immunity should be a matter of
law which juries should not interpret. What concerned Justice
Neely the most, however, was the implication of the decision on
employer liability. 8 He stated that the tone of the majority opi-

nion inspires "the bar to do a substantial disservice to the economy
of this state by instituting frivolous suits every time a workman
is injured by anything other than his own negligence."29

The handling of a Mandolidistype suit has been characterized
by an attitude of uncertainity. Without any definite guidelines,
attorneys have been asking themselves what steps should be taken
to successfully proceed with such a case. One area of uncertainty
centers on the offset of the workmen's compensation award against
the common law damage award. "[T]he amount received or receivable" under the Workmen's Compensation Act has yet to be
clearly defined. Without any clear definition of this the computa-

tion of the offset becomes problematic. Other unsettled areas concern the availability of common law defenses and whether the
jury should be informed of the workmen's compensation awarded
to the plaintiff. This article will examine how trial courts are now
grappling with these procedural difficulties and whether and to

what extent the fears about the impact of Mandolidis are justified.
INTRODUCTION TO CASES BROUGHT UNDER MANDOLIDIS

I.

Since 1978, at least six cases brought under Mandolidis have
reached the trial stage (several other have been settled)." Three
Id. at 923 (Neely, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 922. Neely went on to say that:
2

The tone of the majority opinion invites nuisance lawsuits, a high percentage of which will be settled (particularly by small employers) in
preference to sustaining the cost of litigation. The risk, not necessarily
the eventuality, of an enormous common law jury award in the event
of a capricious judicial process, i.e., an unusually plaintiff oriented trial
judge combined with faulty appellate review are such that some settlements not contemplated by the statutory scheme will inevitably be
forthcoming. Id. at 923.
2 None of the six cases studied here have reached the appellate level, nor
have any of the cases been published in regional or Southeastern reporters.
Therefore, the development of this paper will be different from most law reveiew
articles. For authority, the author depended primarily on pleadings, motions, briefs
and memoranda that are a matter of public record. However, he also relied to
a great extent on conversations with the attorneys involved in the cases. All
of these are noted.
A seventh case has recently been decided, but because of the timing constraints on publication, it could not be incorporated into the text. Santee v. Eastern
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of these, Smith v. A.C.F. Industries,3" Haverty v. Norris
3
and Littlejohn v. Conrail' were brought in federal
Industries,
district court. Those brought in circuit court were Cline v. Joy
Manufacturing Co.,' Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.,3 5
and Marcum v. Windsor Power House Coal Co."

A.

Smith v. A.C.F. Industries

A.C.F. manufactures railroad cars. The plaintiff, Ellis Smith,
an employee of A.C.F. Industries at its Huntington plant, was injured March 8, 1978Y The plaintiff had gone to pick up an oil
Associated Coal Company, Civ. No. 81-C-232 (Cir. Ct. Monongalia Cty. June 25,
1982). In this case the plaintiffs husband, Harvey Santee, was killed in a mining
accident in October, 1980 at Eastern's federal no. 2 mine near Fairview, Monongalia
County. Santee was assigned, along with a fellow employee, to repair a 22,000
pound hydraulic jack, called a long wall mining shield. Santee climbed inside the
apparatus and when his co-worker pulled one of the hydraulic hoses off the jack,
it closed crushing him to death. The plaintiff claimed that Eastern acted willfully,
wantonly and recklessly because it assigned her husband to work on a machine
which had inherent dangers about which her husband had no knowledge. The
jury agreed and awarded a verdict to the plaintiff of 1.2 million dollars in compensatory damages and 1.8 million dollars in punitive damages. Eastern is now
appealing the judgment.
"' Smith, Civ. No. 80-3063 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 1, 1980). For papers filed with
the court write:
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Office of the Clerk, P.O. Box 1570, Huntington, West Virginia, 25716.
Ronald Lawson, Clerk.
2 Haverty, Civ. No. 78-2262 (S.D. W. Va. Jul. 21, 1978). For papers
filed with
the court write:
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Office of the Clerk, P.O. Box 2546, Charleston, West Virginia, 25329.
James McWhorter, Clerk.
11Littlejohn, Civ. No. 79-2404 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 11, 1979) (Conrail was dismissed
from complaint Jan. 6, 1982).
1, Cline, Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct. Mingo Cty. Mar. 19, 1979). For papers
filed with the court write:
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Mingo County, P.O. Box 435, Williamson,
West Virginia, 25661. Robert Webb, Clerk.
3 Mooney, Civ. No. 79-C-6648 (Cir. Ct. Boone Cty. 1979). For papers filed with
the court write:
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Boone County, Boone County Courthouse,
Madison, West Virginia, 25310. H. H. Howell, Clerk.
" Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct. Brooke Cty. 1980). For papers filed
with the court write:
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Brooke County, Wellsburg, West Virginia,
26070. Betty Rockwell, Clerk.
3 Smith v. A.C.F. Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 80-3063 (S.D. W. Va.)(Plaintiff's Com-
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can located between two assembly lines which were approximately
two feet apart. One of the assembly lines called the "pushin" is
a large steel superstructure which pushes in the sides of the
railroad cars. The other assembly line called the "rotator" (or
rollover) is a hydraulic structure which picks up the cars and
rotates them on their sides allowing the pushin to carry out its
function. When the plaintiff was between the two assembly lines,
an arm of the rotator caught the plaintiff in the lower part of
the body, lifted him, and wedged him between the "pushin" support beam and the frame of the "rotator", crushing his chest. 8
The plaintiff alleged that the employer failed to provide a safe
workplace without adequate safeguards and warning devices on
the assembly lines. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant knew of those inadequacies, but did nothing to remedy the
situation until after the accident. 9 More specifically, he alleged
the warning lights and bells, designed to kick on when the
"rotator" was operating were themselves not functioning despite
warning given by the safety administer four days prior to the
accident." Because of this, the plaintiff charged willful, wanton
and reckless misconduct by the defendant and demanded
$750,000.00 in compensatory damages.41
plaint, Defendant's Answer), rev'd, Civ. No. 81-2204 (4th Cir. Sept. 3,1982). Because

of timing restraints on publication, the Fourth Circuit's reversal of Smith could
not be incorporated into the text. The court ruled that Judge Staker erroneously
overruled ACF's motion for a directed verdict because the proof offered at trial
failed to meet the Mandolidis standard. The court found determinative the fact
that in a period of over nine years no employee besides the plaintiff had ever
suffered a serious injury related to the location of the assembly lines. Furthermore, the court found that the warning devices had served their intended purpose. Therefore, the plaintiff did not present evidence of willful or reckless misconduct which is necessary to establish a prima facie case under Mandolidis.
Whether the decision will affect the success of future Mandolidis actions
remains in doubt. State courts usually will follow a Fourth Circuit decision but
are not bound to follow it. There is also question whether the state supreme
court of appeals will take the hint. But at least the Fourth Circuit has provided
some guidance to the lower courts as to the kind of proof that does not satisfy
the Mandolidis standard, and accordingly under what conditions directing verdicts would be appropriate.
I Smith, Civ. No. 80-3063 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 1, 1980) (Plaintiffs Complaint
& Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Memorandum); Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney and defendant's attorney, Smith. More specifically, the plaintiff sustained
a non-union fracture of his clavicle. Id.
19Smith, Civ. No. 80-3063 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 2, 1980) (Plaintiff's Complaint
& Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Memorandum).
40 Id.

"' Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 39.
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There were several facts militating against the plaintiff's case.
First, there were no safety violations by the defendant.42 Second,
the defendant presented evidence that the warning devices had
been repaired prior to the accident. Third, the defendant
presented evidence that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
because he should not have been near the assembly lines.44
After a two day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $170,000.00. The parties stipulated that they
would offset the workmen's compensation award which was finally determined to be $34,507.45," 5 when it was final. This case has
been appealed to the Fourth Circuit.5
B.

Haverty v. Norris Industries, Inc.

In this case, the plaintiff, Leslie Haverty, was an employee
at the defendants' wheel rim plant, at Spencer, West Virginia.
In March, 1978 he lost three fingers while operating a machine
called the Pontiac Spinner.4" The Spinner is comprised of two main
working parts, a nest with rollers around the edges and a piston
that comes down from the top. 4 The downward thrust of the piston
does not occur unless the operator pushes both buttons simultaneously, and continues only as long as the buttons remained
pressed. If the operator releases either button, the piston would
immediately return to its upyard position even if the piston was
as close as one-fourth of an inch from the nest.48
How the plaintiffs hand got caught in the rollers of the nest
is not clear. The plaintiff contended that because of the lack of
safety guards on the machine, he inadvertently pushed one of the
buttons with his forearm and exposed his hand to the working
area.49 The plaintiff disclosed that the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA) had cited similar Norris
Industries plants in Michigan for not having guards on their Pon" Telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney and defendant's attorney,

Smith.
" Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Smith.
4I Id.

Smith, Civ. No. 80-3036 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 1981) (Judgment Order)
See supranote 37.
46 Haverty, Civ. No. 78-2262 (S.D. W. Va.) (Pre-Trial Order, Feb. 25, 1981).
Telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney and defendant's attorney,
Haverty.
11

's

48 Id.

" Telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney, Haverty.
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tiac Spinners and subsequently required the installation of
guards." The plaintiff thus alleged that because the defendant
knowingly required its employees to operate hazardous machinery,
it failed to provide a safe place51to work and was guilty of willful,
wanton and reckless conduct.
The defendant contended that the plaintiffs negligence caused
the accident. It claimed that the plaintiff tried to operate the
machine with one hand and the elbow of the opposite arm in order
to leave one hand free. In this way the plaintiff attempted to obviate the safety features of the machine.2 In addition, the defendant submitted that it had not been cited for any safety violation
at the Spencer plant regarding the accident.' The jury returned
a verdict for the defendant, the only one of the six cases examined
here to 'find for the defendant.5
C.

Littlejohn v. Conrail and A.C.F. Industries

The plaintiff was a brakeman for the defendant, A.C.F. Industries, in its railcar repair yard in Putnam County. 6 He lost
his right hand when he caught it between two railcars.Y The plaintiff was new at his job but he had served as an apprentice to
a veteran brakeman for 19 days.' His duties were to couple and
uncouple cars as they were to be rearranged throughout the
railyard,-9 and he used a multichannel two-way radio to communicate with the engineer.
The plaintiff contended that he was hurt as he was attempting to open the coupling of a standing car. He said he had radioed
the engineer to stop, and the engineer did stop. He had trouble
opening the coupling and while he attempted to open that couplTelephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Haverty.
51 Haverty, Civ. No. 78-2262 (S.D. W. Va. Jul. 21, 1978) (Plaintiff's Complaint).

The plaintiff claimed compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the plaintiffs wife claimed damages for loss of consortium. Id.
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Haverty.
3 Id.
4 Haverty, Civ. No. 78-2262 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 25, 1981) (Judgment Order).
The plaintiff is appealing the case.
Littlejohn, Civ. No. 79-2404 (S.D. W. Va. October 11, 1979).
Littlejohn, Civ. No. 79-2404 (S.D. W. Va. October 11, 1979). (Plaintiff's
Complaint).
57Id.
" Plaintiff had worked on his own for two days before the accident. Conversation with defendant's attorney, Littlejohn.
" Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 56.
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ing, the engineer began moving the cars back again. Before the
plaintiff was able to remove his hand, the backing cars crushed
it in the coupling of standing car." The defendant contended that
the plaintiff failed to radio the engineer to stop as he attempted
to open a coupling he had mistakenly left closed. The defendant
said that the plaintiff hoped to correct his mistake before anyone
could discover it, 6but
not having enough time caught his hand
1
between the cars.
Basing his claim on Mandolidis,the plaintiff averred that the
defendant failed to adequately instruct and train him properly
for his job.2 He claimed that the defendant failed to provide a
safe place to work and inadequately instructed him in the proper
use of the two-way radio.' The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant failed to provide adequate equipment because the railcars
would not couple and uncouple automatically." The defendant
claimed that the plaintiff was grossly negligent and that his fellow
employee was also negligent. 5 At trial the defendant disclosed
that no one in the yard, including the engineer, heard the plain66
tiff over the two-way radio request the engineer to stop.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $600,000.00,67
believed to be the largest verdict ever returned in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. 8
Since the workmen's compensation award was final at $52,449.83,
the final judgment was offset by this amount. 9 The defendant has
moved the district court to set aside the verdict.
D.

Cline v. Joy Manufacturing Co.

The plaintiff, Tim Cline, brought this action against two defendants for injuries he sustained in a coal mining accident. The first,
Joy Manufacturing Company, manufactured the coal mining equipment that injured the plaintiff. The second, Jumacris Mining Com-

II

Id.; conversation with plaintiff's attorney.
Conversation with defendant's attorney, Littlejohn.
Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 56; conversation with plaintiff's attorney.
Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 56.

6Id.

'7

Littlejohn, Civ. No. 79-2404 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 11, 1979 (Defendant's Answer).
Conversation with defendant's attorney, Littlejohn.
Littlejohn, Civ. No. 79-2404 (S.D. W. Va., Jan. 6, 1982) (Judgment Order).
Charleston Gazette, Dec. 4, 1981 at

, col.

€ Littlejohn, Civ. No. 79-2404 (S.D. W. Va., Jan. 6, 1982) (Judgment Order).
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pany, a small privately owned operation, employed the plaintiff."
The accident occurred in March, 1977, at the Jumacris No. 5 Mine
on Ben Creek in Mingo County where the plaintiff, as section foreman, was working the second shift.7' A continuous miner operator in plaintiffs section of the mine informed him that he would
not mine any longer in that area because water was rushing in
on the machine. When the operator left the continuous miner the
plaintiff, himself, began operating it. 2
The operator runs a continuous miner from a seat in a cage
or canopy located low and to the side of the machine. The control
panel in the operator's canopy contains the levers which move
the continuous miner on its tracks. These tracks are very similar
to the tracks on a bulldozer or tank. Since each track is independent, the operator must push both the right and left levers forward in order to move the machine straight ahead and pull both
levers back to move the machine backwards. When the operator
pushes only one of the levers forward, only that track moves, causing the machine to turn toward the opposite direction. Also located
in the canopy are two safety features. On the floor of the canopy
is the "deadman switch." It must be depressed continuously in
order for the machine to move. When the operator takes his foot
off this button, the machine will not move. At the operator's
shoulder is the "panic bar." Pushing this bar causes the machine
to shut down.
When the plaintiff operated the continuous miner, instead of
sitting in the canopy, he stood beside the machine and reached
into the canopy to operate the control levers.73 The "deadman
switch" had been wedged down in a depressed position permitting the machine to be operated in this manner.7 ' He then tried
to tram the machine backwards. What happened next is unclear,
but apparently as the plaintiff trammed the machine back, the
70 Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct. Mingo Cty.). (Plaintiff's
Complaint).
71

Id.

Telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney and defendant's attorney,
Cline. The continuous miner is a heavy piece of mining equipment built very low
to the ground which digs coal. Large rotating bits located at the front of the
machine literally chew the coal out of the coal face while another apparatus shovels
the coal onto a conveyor belt built into the machine itself. The conveyor belt
moves the coal to the back of the machine while more coal is shoveled on.
Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney and defendant's attorney,
Cline.
74 Id.
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left lever stuck in the backwards position while the right lever
was in the neutral or non-moving position.' Consequently, the
machine moved to the right pinning the plaintiff between the wall
and the machine. The plaintiff could not stop the machine because
the "deadman switch" had been wedged down and the "panic bar"
was beyond the reach of the plaintiff." As a result of the accident, the plaintiff lost his right arm and part of his right lung
and severly crushed his chest.'
The plaintiff contended that a broken spring caused the left
lever to remain in the backward position, and if the spring had
been in good working order, the machine would not have turned
on him.7 8 The plaintiff alleged that Joy Manufacturing negligently designed and manufactured the continuous miner because it
did not install proper safety features or give proper warnings.
The plaintiff also alleged that Joy Manufacturing had breached
a warranty that the machine was fit for a particular purpose. 9
The plaintiff alleged that Jumacris Mining Company knew of the
machine's manufacturing defects and its general state of disrepair,
yet required the plaintiff to operate the machine in this dangerous
condition. The plaintiff, therefore, alleged that the defendant mining company was guilty of willful, wanton and reckless conduct,
even though the plaintiff could not plead that the defendant
violated any safety regulation.8
Jumacris based its defense on the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff.' The plaintiffs duty as section foreman was to oversee all safety matters in his area. His operation of the continuous
miner from outside of the canopy with a cap wedge on the "deadman switch" violated all safety rules.' Joy Manufacturing also
based its defense on contributory negligence. However, a day
before the case reached trial, Joy Manufacturing settled out of
court with the plaintiffs.'
75

The defendant, Jumacris Co., contended that there was nothing wrong

with the levers whatsoever.
76

"

Id.
Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 70; Telephone conversation with plain-

tiffs attorney and defendant's attorney, Clive.
,1 Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Cline.

Id.
'0Id.
" Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 70.
Defendant's, Jumacris Mining Co., Answer, supra note 70.
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Cline.
Telephone conversation with attorney, for defendant, Joy Mfg., Cline.
79
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After a four hour deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff. The jury awarded $2,500,000.00 in compensatory
damages to Tim Cline, $500,000.00 in punitive damages to Tim
Cline, and $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages to Bonnie Cline
for loss of consortium, amounting to a total verdict of $4,000,000.00,
believed to be the largest verdict in the state of West Virginia."
The court set aside the verdict as excessive, and granted defendant's motion for a new trial only on the issue of damages.
E.

Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Co.

After her husband was killed by a roof collapse in a coal mine,
the plaintiff, Sandra Mooney, as administratix, brought this action against the defendant."' The deceased, Roger Mooney, was
a section foreman in Eastern's Number Two mine in Barrett,
Boone County.8 As section foreman, he was responsible for insuring that there were no unsafe working conditions in the mine.'
One. of his duties was to make a "fire boss" run before the other
miners entered the mines. This primarily entailed checking
methane levels, but also involved making sure that roofs were
safely supported and that passageways were clear. While on his
fireboss run for the night shift, a large slate rock fell on him
crushing him to death."
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was guilty of willful,
wanton and reckless conduct because it knew that the area of
the mine in which the deceased was killed was extremely hazardous, but that the defendant required the deceased and others to
work there anyway. In addition, she alleged deliberate intent
because there was a broken roof bolt in the same area that had

Cline, Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct., Mingo Cty. Aug. 10, 1981) (Judgment
Order). Interestingly, the only evidence the plaintiff put on regarding loss of con-

sortium was Bonnie's testimony which was to the effect that she and her husband did not enjoy themselves as much as they used to. When asked about loss
of consortium, Tim said he would rather not talk about it. Telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney and defendant, Jumacris Co.'s attorney, Cline.
Cline, Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct., Mingo Cty. Dec. 28, 1981) (Judgment
Order).
Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Co., Civ. No. 79-C-6648 (Cir. Ct. Boone
Cty. Jan. 9, 1979) (Plaintiff's Complaint).

8 Id.
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Mooney.
90Telephone conversation withe plaintiffs attorney, Mooney.
"1

Mooney, Civ. No. 79-C-6648 (Cir. Ct. Boone Cty., 1979) (Plaintiffs Complaint).
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been reported to the defendant, but which the defendant had failed
to replace 2
To substantiate her claims, the plaintiff produced Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) citations for failure to properly maintain roof supports.9 3 In addition, the plaintiff presented
evidence that the area of the mine had a history of roof problems. 4 Finally, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a "fire boss
log book" with entries that showed that the roof had fallen before
and that roofbolts had been sheered off. 5 Eastern contended that
it was not negligent with regard to roof maintenance. It asserted
that it had taken extra precautions to insure adequate roof support and that it had developed a proved program with the help
of MSHA for such purpose. Moreover, the defendant claimed that
roof falls occur in the ordinary course of business in deep mining.'
On March 23, 1981, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $850,000.00. Three hundred fifty thousand
dollars were awarded to Sandra and $500,000.00 was awarded to
her daughter, Melissa. Although the plaintiff claimed punitive
damages, none were awarded. The offset in this case also has yet
to be determined. 99
F. Marcum v. Windsor Power House Coal Co.
The plaintiff, Wendell Marcum, was a miner at the defendants'
Beech Bottom Mine in Brooke County. ' On May 2, 1978, a deenergized hi-line voltage cable fell on the plaintiffs head and
shoulders."0 ' The cable weighed about four and one-half pounds
per foot. The plaintiff, under the supervision of a temporary section foreman, was helping
another fellow worker take about 100
92
feet of the cable down.
92

Id.
Telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney and defendant's attorney,

Mooney.
Id. The plaintiffs proved that there were extra-geological fractures in part
of the mine due to water seepage.
95 Id.

Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Mooney.
9T Id.

11Verdict, Mooney.
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Mooney.

t® Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct. Brooke Cty. 1980) (Plaintiffs Complaint).
I01 Id.
"I Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Marcum.
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The gist of the plaintiff's allegation was that the regular section foreman had required four to six men to do the job, *butthat
on this occasion the temporary section foreman required the plaintiff to do the work with only one other worker."3 The plaintiff
contended that the defendant knew or should have known that
to require work which is usually done by four to six men to be
performed by two men was unreasonably dangerous. Thus, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was guilty of willful, wanton
and reckless misconduct.'" The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant failed to provide a safe place to work.'
The defendants contended that the work could have safely
been performed by one man. Testimony by a United Mine Workers
safety representative and a district safety officer established that
such an operation by two men was not unsafe." 8 The defendants
also demonstrated that they had not violated any safety violations regarding the accident."°7 Finally, the defendants pleaded
the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, contributory
recklessness and assumption of risk."8
The plaintiffs injuries were also disputed. The plaintiff claimed
the blow knocked him unconscious. Since the accident he has suffered from severe headaches, depression, dizziness, disorientation,
loss of memory, and general psychological problems.0 9 The defendants contended that there was no evidence of any kind of physical
injury. The defendants proved that the plaintiff had seen a psyof the same afchiatrist before the accident and had complained
10
injury.
the
before
half
a
and
year
a
flictions
On July 23, 1981, the jury found for the plaintiff. Though
punitive damages were demanded, none were awarded. However,
the jury awarded $425,000.00 in compensatory damages to the
plaintiff and $100,000.00 compensatory damages to his wife, Hattie,
for loss of consortium. The $525,000.00 total was reduced by 25%
10 Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney and defendant's attorney,
Marcum.
'0"Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 100.
105Id.
" Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Marcum.
107Id.

Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct. Brooke Cty. 1980) (Defendant's Answer).
Plaintiff's Complaint supra note 100; telephone conversation with plaintiffs attorney, Marcum.
110Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Marcum.
"'
'0
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because the jury determined that the defendants were 75%
reckless and the plaintiff was 250/o reckless.' The defendants'
motion to set aside the verdict was denied and the offset has yet
to be determined.

II. PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES
A.

Offset of Compensation Award

Article four section two of the Workmen's Compensation Act
states that where an employer intentionally harms his employee,
the employee shall have "a cause of action against the employer
for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable
under the [Act].""' Therefore, an employee who wins a common
law action against his employer must credit the employer for payments received under the Workmen's Compensation Act. On its
face, the calculation required by the statute seems easy enough.
To determine the amount of damages allowed by § 23-4-2 all that
need be done is subtract the amount "received or receivable"
under workmen's compensation from the common law damages.
If the workmen's compensation award is greater than the amount
of damages awarded in the suit at common law, the plaintiff
receives no additional monetary award.
However, the meaning of the term "received or receivable"
has become the subject of much debate. The initial question is
whether "received or receivable" includes future benefits that have
not yet been awarded. The plaintiffs in Mooney v. Eastern
Associated Coal Co. argued that it did not."" Their position was
that "received or receivable" means benefits actually received,
or accrued but not paid."' They based this interpretation of
"received or receivable" on an analogy to the phrase "paid or
payable" in 5 23-4-6(1) of the Compensation Act."8 Under that
statute, compensation terminates on an employee's death "except
that any unpaid compensation which would have been paid or payable to the employee up to the time of his death, if he had lived,
"'

Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct. Brooke Cty. Jul. 31, 1981) (Judgment

Order).
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Marcum.

,, W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981 Replacement Vol.).

,,4
Mooney, Civ. No. 79-6648 (Cir. Ct. Boone Cty. 1979).
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law RE: Offset For Workmen's Compensation Benefits "Received or Receivable," at 3,Mooney.
",

,,.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
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shall be paid to his [dependents].' 1 7 The plaintiff argued that under
that statute, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had
interpreted payable to mean payments which had actually accrued
and which were due to be paid prior to the employee's death.11
The plaintiff urged that the same should apply to "received or
receivable" so that receivable should be only that award which
has accrued before the date of verdict.119
The plaintiff also contended that since the term was in the
disjunctive, the legislature intended to provide alternative
remedies. He argued that the legislature intended that only the
award already received should be offset or only that which will
be received should be offset, but the cumulative total of both could
not be offset.2 Finally, the plaintiff in Mooney argued that
"receivable" could not include future awards because of their speculative nature. The possibility of unknown future events which
might change the amount receivable should not be allowed to serve
as a deduction from the jury amount. 1'
The defendant in Mooney emphasized that to exclude future
compensation awards would permit a double recovery by the plaintiff.'" The clear intent of the last clause of the statute was to
bar any double recovery by the plaintiff. To construe the statute
otherwise would totally contravene the legislature's intent.", In
interpreting the term in its plain meaning, the defendant argued
that it could only mean payments that will be received in the
future. Any other interpretation would distort the language of
the statute. 24 In addition, the defendant attempted to show that
the word "or" was used loosely, and not intended to be disjunctive. The defendant argued that given the plaintiff's interpretation of the phrase, the word receivable would be mere surplusage.12
To this date, the court in Mooney has not ruled on the briefs
by opposing counsel. Whether "received or receivable" includes
W.

VA. CODE § 23-4-6(l1 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, note 116 supra.
W

"'

"'

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.

'
121

"2Defendant's Memorandum of Law: Workmen's Compensation Benefits
Received or Receivable to be Offset Against Jury's Verdict, 9, Mooney.
123Id.
124Id. at 8.
12 Id. at 9.
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future workmen's compensation payments is still a matter of dispute. However, given that the purpose of S 23-4-2 is to provide
an additional rather than an alternative remedy, future workmen's
compensation benefits will probably be included in the computation of the offset.
This is only the threshold question; if future benefits do offset the common law damages, the calculation of those future benefits becomes yet another obstacle to the resolution of a Mandolidis suit. The only cases as yet to offset the workmen's compensation benefits from the common law damages are Smith v.
A.C.F. Industries and Littlejohn v. A.C.F. Industries.2 ' The offset in these cases was possible because the plaintiffs were only
partially disabled. Under this classification the plaintiffs received
a fixed amount of compensation benefits. The final payments had
been made soon after the verdicts, so the offset computations
were only a matter of arithmetic."2 In addition, the parties agreed
that if the plaintiff should reopen his compensation claim, or obtain more benefits in the future, the defendant would be able to
'
recover those amounts paid. 29
In Mooney, the debate was not that simple. Because her husband died, the plaintiff and her child were eligible for the same
benefits the deceased would have received had he lived and been
totally disabled. ' ° Under the total disability classification, the injured worker receives the smaller of 70% of his average weekly
wage or the West Virginia average weekly wage. ' Under the
statute the widow receives payments until her death or remarriage and the child receives payments until he reaches 18 years
of age or if in school, 25 years of age. 32' In Mooney, the widow
was receiving monthly payments based on the West Virginia average wage and will continue to receive payments the rest of her
life, if she does not remarry. Her daughter will share in those
benefits until she is 25.'1 The average weekly wage for the fiscal
...
See also Haverty, Civ. No. 78-2262 (S.D. W. Va., filed July 28, 1978).
'" Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Smith. The plaintiff was
classified as 20% permanently partially disabled.
128 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6 (1981 Replacement Vol.). There is an 80 week limit
on payments under the classification of twenty percent permanently partially
disabled.
'29 Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Smith.
'W W. VA. CODE § 23-4-10 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
,s, W. VA. CODE § 23-4-6 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
'3 W. VA. CODE S 23-4-10 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
'3 Defendant's Memorandum of Law, supra note 122, at 17-18. Seventy per-
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year of 1980-81 was $262.80;" however, this average weekly wage
is recalculated every year and the 1980-81 figure of $262.80 rose
about nine percent from the previous year.'3'
M

The difficulties in estimating the total future payments to be
offset are obvious. Mortality tables must be consulted 3 ' and the
annual change in the average weekly wage must be predicted. 3'

In Mooney, the defendant argued that the recent nine percent increase would be a good measure of subsequent annual changes
in the average weekly wage.'38 The plaintiff disputed this as too
speculative and offered a much smaller figure.
In addition, both sides have argued for increases or decreases
in the figures based on the chance of remarriage or reopening.
In the Mooney case the plaintiff argued that if future payments
are allowed to be deducted some allowance should be given to
the possibility of the plaintiff remarrying." If the widow would
remarry all payments would terminate; thus, the probability of
marriage should be used to reduce the total calculation of future
payments. The defendant countered that such a calculation would
be too speculative and that no statistical study would be sufficient-

ly reliable for calculating total benefits. 4 ' Further, the defendant

cent of $426.00 is $298.80. This was greater than the West Virginia average weekly
wage, so the widow was only entitled to the average weekly wage.
13 Id.
at 18.
13 Id. To complicate matters further, the defendant contended that the Disabled Workers Relief Fund (DWRF) kicks in when the workers' average weekly wage
dips below 33 1/3% of the state's average weekly wage. So in the future, the defendant claimed, if $426.00 was ever below 331/3% of the average weekly wage because
of inflation, the DWRF would contribute more funds to the support of the widow.
13 Id. at iii.
13 The plaintiff suggested calculating the amount receivable by accepting
the figure the state workmen's compensation commissioner establishes as a reserve
for payments to be made in that particular case. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law
supra note 115, at 16.
The defendant dismissed the reserve fund as a reliable indicator of the amount
receivable in this case because (1) the reserve is used for accounting purposes
only; (2) its figures for factoring in the chance of remarriage are unreliable; (3)
the reserve doesn't take into account the increase in the state average weekly
wage; (4) the reserve doesn't account for the DWRF contributions. Defendant's
Memorandum of Law supra note 122, at 26.
13 Defendant's Memorandum of Law supra note 122, at 19.
13 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law supra note 115, at 13.
1,0 Defendant's Memorandum of Law smpra note 122, at 23. In this case the
defendant's approximation of the amount received or receivable under the Act
was $400,000 higher than the plaintiff's estimate of $200,000. Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Mooney.
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contended that the workmen's compensation payments would act
as an incentive for her to remain single.'
The parties in Marcum v. Windsor Power House Coal
Company' faced the problem of reopening as a factor in recalculating the compensation claim. Under article 5, section 2a of
the Compensation Act, any claimant may at any time apply for
additional benefits if his injury worsens.' In Marcum, the plaintiff suffered psychiatric problems from a blow to the head.
Although he was only classified as partially disabled, his injuries
were of the type that could worsen at any time.' Thus, the
possibility of reopening to increase benefits could be considered
in calculation of the offset. The problem with reopening is the
same as with the possibility to remarry. In neither case could there
be adequate statistical data which could be sufficiently reliable.
Another factor that must be weighed in calculating the
workmen's compensation award which is deducted from the common law recovery is present value. The total of payments paid
throughout the claimant's life under the Workmen's Compensation Act must be discounted to reflect its actual value in today's
dollars. This discounting enables the offset to more accurately
reflect the actual worth of the compensation benefits to the claimant. In Mooney the plaintiff argued for a present value reduction
of the total award under Workmen's Compensation by fourteen
percent.' 4' The defendant contended that no present value reduction was necessary, but if any, only a four percent reduction should
be made.'46 The consensus in the legal community is that the total
figure should be reduced to present value, but there is no agree14 7
ment on amount of reduction.
The problem with determining the amount of workmen's compensation benefits received or receivable is an exceedingly complex one. Though most of the plaintiffs' counsel in the cases analyzed have conceded that future benefits are calculable for the
purposes of deduction no one is sure how to make such calcula..
, Id. at 24.

,42Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct. Brooke Cty. 1980).
" W. VA. CODE § 23-54a (1981 Replacement Vol.).
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Marcum.
,' Supra note 116, at 15.
,,8 Supra note 122, at 21.

Telephone conversations with both plaintiff's and defendant's attorneys
in all six cases examined here.
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tions. Since it is so confusing both sides are resorting to the use
of economists and actuaries as expert witnesses in order to prove
their figures. " 8 Generally, the area of permanent total awards
presents the biggest problem because payments extend over the
claimant's life, while permanent partial awards are limited. Thus
for permanent total awards one must determine the claimant's
lifespan and the payments based on the average weekly wage.
This is complicated by the yearly changes in the average weekly
wage which is in itself speculative.
B.

Punitive Damages and the Jury's Knowledge of Workmen's
Compensation Award

The West Virginia Supreme Court has held punitive damages
to be awardable when circumstances indicate malice, willful or
wanton disregard of the rights of others."' This standard of conduct is virtually identical with the standard the West Virginia
Supreme Court has required for the imposition of employer liability in Mandolidis.11 Since both standards require willful and wanton conduct on the part of the defendant, an employee who has
proven the elements necessary to bring a Mandolidis suit, has
necessarily proven the elements for an award of punitive damages.
In four of the six cases studied here, plaintiffs claimed punitive
damages.15"' In Haverty, where the plaintiff caught his hand in the
press, the parties bifurcated the trial and decided the issue of
liability first. 52 Since the verdict was for the defendant, Judge
Copenhaver did not rule on the issue of punitive damages." In
Cline, where the plaintiff lost his arm, the jury awarded $500,000
in punitive damages. However, as mentioned before, the court in
Cline has set aside the entire verdict as excessive and granted
Attorneys have used economists in the Mooney, Marcum and Cline cases.
Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592, 195 S.E.2d 739 (1973); Commonwealth
Fire Co. v. Tri-State Tire Co., 156 W. Va. 351, 193 S.E.2d 544 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S908 (1977) states that punitive damages may be awarded
for "conduct that is outrageous because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others."
'o See notes 10-16 supra, and accompanying text.
'5' Marcum v. Windsor Power House Coal Co., Civ. No. 80-L-152 (Cir. Ct.
Brooke Cty. 1980); Cline v. Joy Mfg., Co., Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct. Mingo Cty.
filed Mar. 19, 1979); Mooney v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., Civ. No. 79-C-6648
(Cir. Ct. Boone Cty. 1978); Haverty v. Norris Industries, Civ. No. 78-2262 (S.D.
W. Va., filed Jul. 21, 1978).
"I Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Haverty.
153Id.
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a new trial solely on the issue of damages.'- In Mooney, where
a roof collapse killed the plaintiffs decedent, the jury refused to
award the punitive damages demanded.
In Marcum, where a cable fell on the plaintiffs head and
shoulders, Judge Tsapis dismissed the claim for punitive damages
while denying the defendants' motions for a directed verdict as
to liability.'55 The defendants based their motion for a directed
verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove willful,
wanton and reckless conduct by the employer.' 6 Since the elements necessary for an award of punitive damages and the burden of proof in a Mandolidis action are the same, Judge Tsapis
should have either directed a verdict for the defendants or allowed
the claim for punitive damages. Therefore, this points out that
if a showing of punitive damages has not been made, courts should
be more willing to grant directed verdicts as to employer liability in Mandolidis cases.
Whether punitive damages are subject to offset should raise
some fear among defendants. Since punitive damages are designed
to punish the defendant, plaintiffs' counsel have been arguing that
punitive damages should not be diminished by what was received
from workmen's compensation benefits. In addition, workmen's
compensation benefits are compensatory and not designed to be
punitive in nature. Therefore, any benefits "received or receivable"
under the act should be deducted from only compensatory award.
If a court allows punitive damages to be untouched, it would not
only increase the award received by the plaintiff but further complicate the calculations of the offset.
Whether the jury should be informed that the plaintiff has
received compensation benefits creates another troubling area.
The argument cuts both ways. To inform the jury of the compensation benefits the plaintiff has received may cause the jury to
award a higher amount to overcome the offset. This was supposedly part of the jury's reasoning in Cline.' However, such informa' Cline, Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct., Mingo Cty. Dec. 28, 1981) (Judgment
Order).
" Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Marurm.
Id.
,8 Affidavit of Esta Arlene Kirk, Cline. The affidavit states:
I am Esta Arlene Kirk and I reside at Kermit, West Virginia. I
was one of the jurors who sat on the jury in the trial of Tim and Bonnie
Cline versus Jumacris Mining Company. After our approximate four-
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tion may cause the jury to award a smaller amount since they
would believe there is no reason to compensate him further.
In the cases studied here, only in Cline did the court inform
the jury that the plaintiff received workmen's compensation benefits. The jury deliberations indicate that knowledge of the
workmen's compensation award was an important factor in their
hour deliberation and when we came into the court room, the Judge
asked each of us" if that was our verdict. When it came to me, I replied,
"I reckon so," because I could not have said yes, because I did not agree
with it and if I had been asked to explain what I meant, I would have
said that there were some questions that needed to be answered in
my mind before I could come to a decision in the case. These questions
came to mind at different times in the jury room. Some of them are
the following:
I did not understand the meaning of what I now have been told
is punitive damages. When I asked what punitive damages were, I was
told that because it had something to do with the coal mining industry
that they had to be given in this case.
I was told that whatever we gave to the Clines, half of it would
go to the lawyers, and out of the other remaining half, Cline would have
to pay back to Compensation everything that he had drawn.
When some members of the jury said they were for giving six
million dollars, the amount that he sued for, I objected to this. After
a long discussion, during which time people were getting upset, including
myself, and since I did not feel it right to award such sums, I said that
I would disqualify myself. I was told that if I did that this was the only
chance that Tim and Bonnie Cline would have. During this discussion
as some of the jurors were saying we should give six million dollars,
they considered the fact that Buck Harless not only owned the mining
company, but banks and many other companies. Sometime during this
discussion some juror said that I was a liar, which I denied.
At one point, I asked to go out and ask the Judge a question about
what I now have been told is punitive damages, and some of the jurors
objected saying that if we did, they would think we were stupid people.
The only time any member of the jury mentioned anything that
the Court instructed us was the question I had about punitive damages
and the fact that I called to their attention that the Judge had told
us that we should not be influenced by sympathy. Other members of
the jury kept saying that I should consider what I would do if it was
my husband, and at another time members of the jury said that we
should give an award in this case so that it would open up the way
for other miners who had gotten hurt on the job to get more than just
Workmen's Compensation.
At no time during the jury deliberations was there any talk about
what willful, wanton and reckless conduct was.
Toward the last of our discussion, I went to the restroom, and when
I came out, they told me that they had reached a decision and said,
"Come on, let's go outside." I asked them what the decision was, and
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verdict."' Since the jury verdict in Cline was by far the largest
of any case analyzed here, this might imply that to mention the
award of compensation benefits would cause the jury to inflate
their verdict. However, this might not be the case.
In Marcum, Judge Tsapis prohibited the parties from men59
tioning that the plaintiff had received a compensation award."
Both parties felt it was to their advantage to not inform the jury
of the award, but after the case, defending counsel reconsidered
that position. They felt the jury might have awarded less if they
had known the plaintiff was being compensated.16
On the other hand, defending counsel in Mooney indicated that
the verdict might have been higher had there been mention of
the compensation award.'61 The court in Mooney kept any mention of workmen's compensation from the jury.'6' In two of the
remaining cases, the defendants had the option to bring the fact
of workmen's compensation benefits into the case or leave it out.'"
In both, the defense chose to keep it out of the trial.
There is a possibility that if mention is not made of workmen's
compensation benefits, the jury will not understand the context
of the case. Instead of seeing it as an excess suit, they might see
it as a mere negligence suit. Viewed in simplistic terms, the jury
sees that someone has been injured and that he should be compensated for it. Therefore, despite the result in Cline it is probably better to mention that workmen's compensation benefits have
been awarded so that the jury can understand the case as an excess suit not as a negligence suit. From the defendant's viewpoint
when they told me, I objected, but they all insisted that we go outside
and that's the reason when the Judge asked me if it was my verdict,
I said, "I reckon so."
This affidavit is being dictated by W. T. Shaffer, who has done
so in the presence of myself and my husband, Harlan Kirk, after a general
discussion of what occurred in the jury room and after I was discharged
from serving on the jury anymore. While the words used in the affidavit
are not always exactly the words that I might have used, they fairly
say what I have said in this discussion.
Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney, Cline.
'9 Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Marcum.
1C3Id.

161Telephone

conversation with defendant's attorney, Mooney.

162 Id.

11 In Smith, the judge left the decisions to the defendant where in Littlejohn the judge let the parties agree not to mention compensation payments to
the jury.
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the best way to bring this about would be to say that compensation benefits have been paid, but not mention how much have been
paid. The plaintiff, of course, would want the jury to be informed
of how much has been paid in hopes the jury might inflate their
verdict.
C.

Consortium

Wives of the plaintiffs received loss of consortium in two of
the cases studied here. In Cline, the jury awarded Bonnie Cline
one million dollars in spite of little evidence presented to substantiate such a claim."' Bonnie Cline took the stand and testified that
her sex life was not as good as it used to be after her husband's
accident and Tim Cline said that he would rather not talk about
it.165 Ndvertheless, the jury awarded large damages for Bonnie
Cline's claim. In Marcum, the jury also awarded the wife of the
injured plaintiff damages for loss of consortium; in that case the
amount was $100,000.00.166
Although these claims were made and verdicts were won, a
claim for consortium may not be proper in a Mandolidis suit. The
pertinent part of 5 23-4-2 states that "the employee, the widow,
widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have ... [a]
cause of action against the employer as if this chapter had not
been enacted ....
" 7 This indicates that the legislature intended
that either the employee or his dependent would have the right
to sue at common law. To permit an award of consortium would
exceed the scope of the Act. Furthermore, the class of persons
described in §23-4-2 is generally that of dependents, the same class
of persons described for the purposes of death benefits in Article
4, Section 10, of the Compensation Act." Both sections are describing the same class of persons for the same purpose-death
benefits. The right of any person other than the employee to take
under the act would depend upon the death of the employee. Until the employee dies, the legislature has vested him with the only
right to sue under common law pursuant to §23-4-2. Moreover,
'" Cline, Civ. No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct. Mingo Cty., June

9, 1981) (Judgment

Order).

" See note 85, supra.
" Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct., Brooke Cty., Jul. 31, 1981) (Judgment

Order).
W. VA. CODE 5 23-4-2 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-10 (1981 Replacement Vol.) Cf. Pocardi v. Ott 82 W. Va.
497, 96 S.E. 770 (1918).
16
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since the legislature chose the word "widow" instead of the word
"spouse" indicates that a wife's claim for loss of consortium would
not be proper.
Following this reasoning, a federal district court in West
Virginia dismissed a wife as a plaintiff in a suit brought under
Mandolidis.Judge Knapp in Grayley v. Ar'maco Steel169 concluded
that 523-4-2 does not provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses of employees intentionally injured by their
employer. The basis of the judge's determination was that 523-4-2
provided a cause of action for a spouse only on the death of the
1 70
employee.
D.

Common Law Defenses

Another area of uncertainity in Mandolidis suits is whether
the common law defenses of contributory (comparative) negligence,
assumption of risk, and fellow servant rule are available. The problem with these defenses is that they are usually asserted when
the defendant has committed a negligent act, but here, under Mandolidis the defendant has allegedly committed an intentional act
of omission. Therefore, the question arises whether the defendant
can raise the "negligence" defenses in a case of deliberate intention. The answer is different for each of the defenses.
1.

Contributory (Comparative) Recklessness

In a Mandolidis action, the defendant can not properly assert
the defense of contributory or comparative negligence since such
defense is not available where the defendant has committed willful
or wanton acts. 171 However, some defendants' counsel have
asserted the defense of contributory recklessness alleging that the
plaintiffis guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. For support
the defendants have relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
which states in pertinent part of Section 503(3) that "[a] plaintiff
whose conduct is in reckless disregardof his own safety is barred
from recovery against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the
plaintiffs safety is a legal cause of the plaintiffs harm."'72 In addition, defendants' counsel have relied upon other jurisdictions

Grayley, Civ. No.
"G9

-

(S.D. W. Va. 1981).

170Id.
'
Barr v. Curry, 137 W. Va. 364, 71 S.E.2d 313 (1952).
"r RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 503(3) (1977).
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which have upheld contributory recklessness defenses."'
In response, plaintiffs' counsel have asserted that contributory
recklessness is not a valid defense since the West Virginia court
adopted comparative negligence in Bradley v. Appalachian
Power.' Contributory recklessness is not consistent with a comparative doctrine because it operates as a complete bar to any
claim. They claim that the only consistent approach would be a
defense that does not act as a bar but only reduces the plaintiffs
recovery by the proportionate amount of his recklessness.
In the six cases studied here, the courts were split, four giving contributory recklessness instructions, and two giving comparative recklessness instructions. In Smith, Judge Staker charged
the jury, as follows: "Furthermore, a plaintiff is in reckless disregard of his own safety and which proximately causes the plaintiffs injuries, is barred from recovering against a defendant even
where the defendant's reckless disregard of the plaintiffs safety
is a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. . . ,,17Judge
Copenhaver gave virtually the same instruction as to contributory
recklessness in Haverty and Littlejohn 71 as did Judge Bronson inthe Cline case1 7 In each of the cases the defense would act to
completely bar the plaintiff from recovery.
The courts in Mooney and Marcum however, refused to give
Second Pre-trial Memorandum of Windsor Power House Coal Co. at 12-13
(citing Spring v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co., 44 111App. 3d 5, 357 N.E.2d
17

1330 (1976); Harrington v. Collins 298 N.C. 535, 259 S.E.2d 275 (1979); Pearce v.

Durham, 271 N.C. 285, 156 S.E.2d 290 (1976); Hardis v. Griffin, 239 S.C. 529, 123
S.E.2d 876 (1962)).

. Bradley v. Appalachian Power, 256 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va. 1979) (citing Stone
v. Rudolph 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944)).
7 Instructions given, Smith.
176Instructions given, Haverty. Instructions given, Littlejohn. Judge
Copenhaver gave the further instruction:
Finally, even though you may find by a preponderance of the
evidence in this case that the defendant ....[acted] in reckless disregard
of the safety of the plaintiff ... with a knowledge and appreciation
of the high degree of risk of physical harm to plaintiff thereby created,
[and] if you also find by a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time [plaintiff] ... was injured ...[his conduct] constituted a reckless
disregard for his own safety which was a proximate cause of his injury,

then you should return a verdict for the defendant.
'" The defendant's instruction given in Cline was:

The Court instructs the jury that a plaintiff whose conduct is in
reckless disregard of his own safety and which proximately causes the
plaintiffs [sic] injuries is barred from recovering against the defendant,
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an instruction on contributory recklessness but would only charge
the jury as to comparative recklessness. "8 The charge given by
Judge Tsapis in Marcum is indicative of a comparative
recklessness charge. He said in pertinent part:
[I]f
you find that the recklessness of Mr. Marcum did not
equal or exceed the recklessness, if any, of Windsor, you must
then determine the total award of damages sustained by Mr.
Marcum and Mrs. Marcum ....Then as a next step you should

determine the percentage of recklessness which you attribute
to Mr. Marcum and to Windsor ....

The Court will then com-

pute the award of damages, if any to the plaintiffs against the
defendants by reducing the amount found in response to question number one by the percent
of his own negligence found
7
in question number two.' '

The jury in this case found the plaintiff 25% reckless and the
defendant 750 reckless, and
Judge Tsapis reduced the total
8
damage figure accordingly.'

Because the instructions the courts gave were split, a conclusive prediction as to what instructions will be given in the
future would be difficult. However with the court's relatively recent adoption of comparative negligence, the comparative
recklessness defense will probably be the one allowed in upcom-

ing cases.
2.

Assumption of Risk
Whether one can assume the risk of another's willful and wan-

even where a defendant's reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. And so if you find by a
preponderance of the evidence in this case that the defendant, Jumacris
Mining Company, in reckless disregard of the safety of the plaintiff,
Tim Cline, knowingly required him to operate a machine which was unsafe, and if you also find by a preponderance of the evidence that before
Tim Cline was injured by the said machine, he was improperly operating
said machine by short cutting one of the machine's built-in safety devices,
and further, that he was operating the same by walking along outside
the compartment designed for the operator, and that this constituted
a reckless disregard for his own safety, which was a proximate cause
of his injury, then you should return a verdict for the defendant, Jumacris
Mining Company.
" Telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney and defendant's attorney,
Mooney.
'
Defendant's Instruction No. 24, given, Marcum.
Marcum, Civ. No. 80-C-152 (Cir. Ct. Brooke Cty. Jul. 31, 1981) (Judgment

Order).
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ton act poses another problem in Mandolidis suits. The federal
district court held in Santiago v. Clark'8' that "[t]he doctrine of
assumption of risk .... retains its viability in West Virginia." '

The court affirmed the same position in Cross v. Nolandl where
it stated that the essence of assumption of risk is that the plaintiff had been venturous in his actions.'" If all that is required is
that the plaintiff be venturous it would seem that the defense
is still alive. However, in Korzun v. Shahan,"' one of the cases
on which Santiago relied, the court stated that the defense of
assumption of risk is not available to a defendant guilty of willful
and wanton conduct which operates to injure the plaintiff.'86
Therefore, whether assumption of risk can still validly be used
in Mandolidis actions is not clear.
Nevertheless, of the six cases studied here courts in three
of the cases allowed instructions on assumption of risk. Only in
Haverty and Marcum, did the Judges explicitly refuse to charge
the jury as to assumption of risk. Judge Cooper in Mooney and
Judge Bronson in Cline did instruct the jury on assumption of
risk. 18 7 Furthermore, in Smith, Judge Staker instructed the jury
that
if you should find from a preponderance of the evidence in this
case that by his actions the plaintiff thus assumed the risk of
any hazard that may have been posed to his safety by the rotator
and push mentioned in the evidence, then the plaintiff may not
recover in this case even though you may likewise believe that
the defendant was guilty of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct which proximately contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.'"
Although Korzun suggests otherwise, some courts are instructing
juries on assumption of risk in Mandolidis cases. Therefore defending attorneys may continue to attempt to assert assumption of
risk as a defense in Mandolidis suits citing as authority the cases
mentioned above.
3.

Fellow Servant Rule
The fellow servant rule has grown into disuse because it has
181

Santiago, 444 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. W. Va. 1978).

"

Id. at 1079.

18 156 W. Va. 1, 190 S.E.2d 18 (1972).
"

Id. at 6-7, 190 S.E.2d at 22.
151 W. Va. 243, 151 S.E.2d 287 (1966).

188 rd.
187

Telephone conversation with plaintiffs' attorneys, Mooney, Cline.

11 Instructions given in Smith.
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been statutorily replaced by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
However, with the advent of Mandolidis, the fellow servant rule
is again being asserted in West Virginia. The supreme court of
appeals recently held the defense to be still valid in Shackleford
v. Catlett." The court stated that members of a county court who
were eligible non-subscribers to the Workmen's Compensation
Fund could assert the fellow servant defense when sued in their
official capacity.
However, there are factors that mitigate against the effective use of the defense in Mandolidis cases. In West Virginia the
court long ago held that the fellow servant defense cannot be invoked where the employer is found to be concurrently negligent
with the fellow employee. ' " In Mandolidis actions, the employer
would be at least concurrently negligent since the employee must
prove not mere negligence but willful and reckless misconduct
by the employer.
However, in the two cases where the fellow servant defense
was applicable, the judges instructed the jury on that defense.
In Smith, where the plaintiff was trapped in machinery of the
assembly lines, Judge Staker charge the jury:
Moreover, if you find, from a preponderance of the evidence,
that the injuries suffered by plaintiff Ellis W. Smith, were proximately caused by the negligence of one of his fellow employees,
then you may not return a verdict for plaintiff and must return
a verdict for defendant, ACF Industries. 91
In Marcum, Judge Tsapis charged the jury with a similar instruction. With some courts willing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of fellow servant, defending attorneys can use such instructions as a powerful weapon against a plaintiff since it is a complete bar to recovery.92
III.
A.

OTHER FACTORS

Third Party Actions
According to Article 2 Section 6 of the West Virginia Com-

Shackleford, 244 S.E.2d 327 (1978).
' Reilly v. Nicoll, 72 W. Va. 189, 77 S.E. 897 (1913).
...
Instructions given in Smith.
'" The doctrine of last clear chance has been judicially abolished by the
Supreme Court of Appeals and so is unavailable in Mandolidis cases as it is in
all others. Ratliff v. Yocum, Civ. No. 14507 (W. Va., filed July 14, 1981).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

pensation Act, the employer who pays into the Workmen's Compensation Fund is not to be held "liable to respond in damages
at common law or by statute for the injury or death of any
employee, however occuring," unless the employer defaults in payents to the fund.'93 This section protects employers from suits by
third parties, usually manufacturers, for contribution after the
third party has been sued by the employee.
But as in 523-4-2, the employer's immunity extends only toward
his negligent acts that injure the employee. The statute extends
immunity from liability "to every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of such employer when he is acting in furtherance of the employer's business and does not inflict an injury
with deliberate intention."'' So, if the employer is guilty of willful
misconduct, he conceivably can lose his immunity from third party
actions under 523-2-6. This possibility which was relatively remote
before Mandolidis is no longer remote.
The federal district court has addressed this issue in two cases.
In Belcher v. J. H. Fletcher & Co.,"' a third party brought an action for contribution from the employer of the deceased employee.
The deceased who worked for Allied Chemical Company, was
killed in a mining accident while operating a roof bolter. His wife
as administratix, subsequently brought an action against J. H. Fletcher & Company, who had manufactured the machine. J. H. Fletcher in turn sought contribution from Allied Chemical alleging
that Allied was primarily negligent."' The court held that contribution could not be had from Allied because it was immune
from third party actions by the provisions of §23-2-6.1" The court
then went on to say that Allied did not fall into either of the exceptions to the Workmen's Compensation Fund. Second and more
importantly; the court held that Allied could not be held liable
on the basis of deliberate intent because neither the plaintiff nor
the third party had alleged willful, wanton and reckless conduct
necessary under Mandolidis.9"' 8
The Belcher decision opened the door for Sydenstricker v.
UnipunchProducts.'" In that case a third party again sought con13

19

S 23-2-6 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE 5 23-2-6a (1981 Replacement Vol.).
Belcher, 498 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. W. Va. 1980).

W. VA. CODE

196

Id.

197

Id.

198Id.
19

Sydenstricker, Civ No. 80-3095 (S.D. W. Va., filed Feb. 13, 1981)
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tribution from the employer of an injured employee. However,
in Unipunch, the third party manufacturer alleged willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct on the part of the employer, contending that this conduct removed any employer immunity."' 0 The
district court declined to decide the question because there was
no local state authority on that point of law. Instead the court
certified the question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. The West Virginia court held that the deliberate intent
exception contained in S 23-4-2 permitted the defendant to bring
a third-party action in contribution against the employer of the
injured plaintiff.2 ' The prospect of costly third party actions is
now a reality with employers subject to liability regardless of
whether the plaintiff employee chooses to sue his employer or not.
B.

Settlements

Since Mandolidis,several employees and deceased employees'
families have been settling for sums much larger than they would
have obtained before Mandolidis.Perhaps the best examples are
the settlements obtained by the families of the construction
workers killed in the Willow Island disaster. The accident, which
occured in April 1978, resulted in fifty-one deaths.022 Immediately
thereafter some fifty-one claims were brought against the utilities,
contractors, suppliers, designers, testing laboratories, and
engineers. 3 However, the claims did not name the employer of
the workers, Research Cottrell °14 When the court decided Mandolidis two months later all of the plaintiffs amended their com-

I!d.
22

Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Products Inc., 288 S.E.2d 511, 517 (W. Va. 1982).
N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1978, § 1 at 1, Col. 1; Wash. Post, April 28, 1978,

1 at 1, Col. 1.The workers were building a cooling tower for an electric generating
plant. They were standing on a scaffolding that was anchored on the twentyeighth layer of concrete while they were pouring the concrete for the next layer.
Apparently, the concrete layer that was supposed to support them hadn't sufficiently dried. Id.
...
Telephone conversation with attorney respresenting the employer,
Research Cottrell. The defendants were: Allegheny Power System, Monongahela
Power, West Penn., Potomac Edison (utility companies); Pittsburgh Testing
Laboratories, Ohio Valley Testing Laboratories (tested concrete mixture); Mar-

quette Ce~nent, Criss Concrete, Master Builders (supplied concrete); United
Engineers and Constructors, Inc., (contractors); Cohen-Baretto-Machertas
(engineers); Hamon-Sobelco, S.A. (designers of cooling tower). Plaintiff's amended

Complaint, Bafile v. Alleghany Power Systems, Civ. No. 79-C-62 (Cir. Ct. Pleasants
County, filed 1979).
224 Telephone conversation with attorney representing the employer.
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plaints to include Research Cottrell as a defendant.,' Most of the
complaints demanded two to three million dollars compensatory
damages plus punitive damages. About half of the cases have now
been settled. According to counsel of Research Cottrell, the plaintiffs are settling in the $150,000.00 range."'
Since the Mandolidis decision there have been several settlements by employees or their beneficiaries with their employers.
In Hicks v. Gould Mines Inc., °7 where the plaintiff suffered a leg
injury while on the job, the parties settled for approximately
$200,000.00.2o8 The spouses and dependents of the miners killed

2
in the 1979 explosion at Westmoreland Mines in West Virginia 11
have also recently settled for over $500,000.00."' These settlements
are in addition to any workmen's compensation benefits received
by the employees or their beneficiaries. Since Mandolidis more
claims have been settled for larger amounts than ever before.
These claims, no matter how frivolous or meritorious are imposing a substantial burden upon employers in this state.

C. Insurance
The most troubling aspect of Mandolidis liability is that it
is not an insurable risk. The self insuring companies such as
Eastern Coal Co. and Windsor Power House Coal Co. are able
to factor the cost into their underwriting. However, other companies, not self insured, generally cannot obtain insurance
coverage for a Mandolidis type claim. Neither the State
" Telephone conversation with attorney representing the employer. It does
not take much contemplation to deduce that the Supreme Court of Appeals was
influenced by the Willow Island Disaster. The Mandolidis decision followed on
the heels of the accident.
206

Id.

11 Hicks, Civ. No. 79-C-1352 (Cir. Ct. Greenbrier Cty., 1979).

" The plaintiff alleged willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct by the
employer, because the foreman shut off one of the four malfunctioning brakes
prior to the accident. Conversation with attorney for the defendant, Gold Mines,
Inc.
Chas. Gazette, Sept. 23, 1981, S 1 at 4, Col. 1. "Because of this disaster,
the State Department of Mines cited the company with 250 violations of state
laws and proposed $319,000 in fines." Id
210In Boone County, two of the families settled for $560,00 each and in Logan
County, a family settled for $500,000. Two remaining claims are not yet settled.
If these claims are settled for $500,000 or more, Westmoreland will have to pay
over two and one half million dollars. Telephone conversation with attorney
representing the employer, Westmoreland Coal Company.
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Workmen's Compensation Fund" nor private insurers212 will pay
an employer's liability costs when an employer has intentionally,
willfully or recklessly injured his employee. 13 As a result, the
employer must absorb the entire cost of the litigation and his damages himself. This cost must be eventually charged to the consumer of the employer's product increasing the product's cost and
making it much less competitive. Some non-admitted insurers are
providing expensive though limited coverage to employers for
Mandolidis claims. 4 The net effect of such limited insurance is
that employers must still bear the heavy burden of the possibili-

ty of a Mandolidis type claim.
III. IMPACT OF MANDOLIDIS
A thorough analysis of recent cases brought under Mandolidis
convincingly illustrates that the worst fears expressed by Justice
Neely in his dissent in Mandolidis'5 have come true. The verdicts
of the cases studied have been exorbitant. Small companies, such
W. VA. CODE S 23-4-2 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
211 Telephone conversation with attorney representing
211

American Insurance
Institute.
2"' But see Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co. 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981), where a
plaintiff sued the defendant's insurance company for punitive damages. The W.
Va. Supreme Court of Appeals stated that such right exists when the insurance
company's policy has only excluded damages caused by the insured's intentional
wrong and the insured was found to have committed an act of gross, reckless
or wanton negligence.
The supreme court's standard here can do nothing but further muddle the
distinction between an intentional wrong and a negligent wrong in West Virginia.
Under Mandolidisan employer is said to have committed a deliberate wrong by
willful, wanton and reckless misconduct. Yet in Hensley, a defendant's gross recklessness or wanton negligence is not an intentional wrong, and therefore a wrong
said to be covered by the defendant's insurance policy.
Apparently willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct is a bit more grievious
than gross recklessness or wanton negligence. Therefore, conduct of the Mandolidis severity might be deemed intentional , and thus not covered by an insurance policy which expressly excludes coverage of damages caused by the defendant's intentional act.
The coverage problem in Mandolidis terms still is not changed then. The
supreme court in Erie said the determining factor was that the policy there only
expressly excluded damages caused by the defendant's intentional wrong. The
court recognized that an insurance company can decline to move against paying
punitive damages by simply including an express exclusion in its policy. As has
already been mentioned, most insurance companies expressly exclude coverage
of damages caused by defendant's willful, wanton and reckless misconduct.
2,' See note 213, supra.
25 Mandolidis 246 S.E.2d

at 926 (Neely J. dissenting).
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as Jumacris, in no way can absorb verdicts which are three times
their total assets.210 Nor can larger companies, such as Easter,
continually lose verdicts of 850,000 dollars and continue to make
a profit.217 Not only may employers be subject to great liability
28
to their employees but they may become liable to third parties. 1
This is because third party manufacturers may circumvent the
employer immunity to contribution under 523-2-6219 by claiming
that the employer acted willfully, wantonly and recklessly toward
his employee. The lack of available insurance only compounds the
problem in West Virginia, helping to create a totally hostile climate
for all business enterprises in this state. This especially applies
to small busineses such as the corner grocer, who could easily
be put out of business by such large verdicts.
Not only have the number of employee claims increased since
Mandolidis but the cost of settlements are rising as well. As
Justice Neely predicted, with the proliferation of suits that followed Mandolidis employers are facing many frivolous claims such
as the slip and fall cases that have been filed recently. 20 These
claims must be met and the prospect of multi-million-dollar verdicts has forced many employers to settle, whereas, before Mandolidis employers could rest assured that they were protected
by §23-4-2 from most suits by their employees. Now, after Mandolidis, the employers must defend every suit brought since the
West Virginia court, in Mandolidis, foreclosed virtually all prospect of obtaining a summary judgment by implying that all cases
must go to the jury for a factual determination of whether the
employer was guilty of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct.21
These nuisance suits that Justice Neely feared are a real and
present threat to the ability of a company to carry on a business.
As Justice Neely stated: "The settlements I hypothesize combined
over the course of a year, plus the attendant costs of defending
frivolous law suits, are the type of expenses which not only divert
needed resources from the fund available for wages, plant moderconversation with defendant's attorney, Cline. The verdict of
four million dollars was three times the total assets of Jumacris.
27 The $850,000 verdict rendered against Eastern cut into its annual profit
by 33 percent.
218See notes 191-99 supra and accompanying text.
2W9W. VA. CODE S 23-2-6 (1981 Replacement Vol.)
Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 921.
' See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 155-56 where
Judge Tsapis was willing to grant summary judgment as to issue of punitive
damages but refused to direct verdict as to issue of liability.
236 Telephone

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss4/7

36

Mohler: In Wake of Mandolidis: A Case Study of Recent Trials Brought unde
IN WAKE OF MANDOLIDIS

1982]

nization, and stockholders' dividends, but contribute to inflation
.*.. .2' Unfortunately, Justice Miller's statement that the mere
difficulty in proving a Mandolidis suit will protect employer's from
lfabilityl has proven to be grievously incorrect. The facts and
results of the six cases analyzed here prove him incorrect.
In most of the cases discused in this article, the facts suggest
at most the existence of negligent conduct by the employer, but
not conduct intended to harm. Even when one views the facts most
favorably for the plaintiff, the defendants' conduct in all six cases
extends no higher than gross negligence. Moreover, the facts in
Marcum, Smith and Littlejohn indicate that the plaintiffs' injuries
in each of these cases resulted from the plaintiffs' own carelessness. In the most astounding case, Cline, the injured plaintiff did
everything an operator should not do when running a continuous
miner. 4 The plaintiff claimed that the mining company intended
to kill him because one of the levers malfunctioned. This case
should not even be sustained on negligence grounds because the
sole and proximate cause of his injuries was the plaintiff's own
recklessness. If he had not operated the machine from outside
the canopy, the injury would have never happened. In light of
all this, the jury awarded a verdict against the employer of four
million dollars.
Obviously, the juries do not understand the willful, wanton
and reckless standard necessary under Mandolidis to remove the
employer's immunity. They have mistaken this standard as a negligence standard. This is understandably so, since the West
Virginia Supreme Court did not adequately define what conduct
it envisioned to be willful, wanton and reckless." Perhaps the
problem lies in the "capricious judicial process"' that Justice Neely mentioned in his dissent in Mandolidis.In the Smith case, five
out of the six jury members were union members at a time when
members working at the defendant's ACF plant were on strike. '
In the Mooney case several miners were on the jury and most
of the jurors were mine connected.' Finally, in Cline, eight of the
jurors were United Mine Workers members and the United Mine
Mandolidis 246 S.E.2d at 923.
Id.
See notes 70-99 supra and accompanying
1 See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying
I Mandolidis 246 S.E.2d at 923.
Telephone conversation with defendant's
Telephone conversation with defendant's
M

2'

text.
text.
attorney, Smith.
attorney, Mooney.
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Workers were on strike at the time the case went to trial.22 9 In
an affidavit by one of the jurors in the Cline case, the juror stated
that the only time any member of the jury mentioned anything
about the court's instructions concerned punitive damages. Their
discussion of punitive damages was that they should be awarded
because they had something to do with the coal mining industry."0
Never did the jury mention or discuss willful, wanton and reckless
misconduct."'
The danger of letting these cases go to the jury is self evident. As in Cline, the jury simply does not understand or cannot
apply the standard to the facts. But beyond the gut feelings of
jurors as to who is hurt and who should be compensated, the
defense is in a compromising position because it has no real
defenses with which to counter the plaintiff's claims. Comparative
recklessness is as nebulous as willful misconduct and harder to
prove. Assumption of risk may not even be available and the fellow
servant doctrine has limited applicability. Therefore, an employer
becomes in essence strictly liable for all injuries sustained by an
employee who alleges willful and wanton misconduct by the
employer.
Employees should be compensated; it is just that they should
not be compensated twice at the expense of the employer. The
policy of workmen's compensation is to compensate the employee
for work-related injuries while protecting the employer from a
common law claim for damages. Mandolidis has completely annihilated the effective operation of this philosophy in West Virginia. Now, not only is an employee compensated by workmen's
compensation benefits, but he also has a chance of obtaining a
high common law recovery even though the defendant isn't guilty of deliberate intent. This is not what the legislature intended.
The common law damages have been so high that even with an
offset the worker is the recipient of an enormous windfall. And,
an employee can obtain this windfall without proving his case
because the juries simply do not understand the standard. All
of this is at the employers' expense, and it will not go without
repurcussion. With Mandolidis exposing employers to massive
liability, many employers will be forced to leave the state while
others will be discouraged from locating here in the first place.
Telephone conversation with defendant's attorney, Cline.
Affidavit of Esta Arlene Kirk, supra note 157.
231

Id.
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SOLUTION

The only adequate solution would be for the legislature to correct the statute that gave the supreme court the opportunity to
make its mistake. There are several states that have intentional
employer injury statutes as part of their workmen's compensation laws. Some states provide that the compensation award be
increased by 50 per cent or even 100 per cent 2 if it is determined
that the employer intentionally injured the employee.
This would be a large improvement over §23-4-2 especially if
the determination of intentional injury would be made in the administrative forum. This would relieve the employer of the costly
burden of defending himself in suits at law (while also subjecting
himself to massive liability). In addition, under the increased award
system, the ultimate employee award would be much less than
employees are currently receiving. This is proven by the cases
analyzed above where the jury award has been as much as twelve
times the workmen's compensation award.2 33 Moreover, the
automatic increase of the award on determination of intent to injure would eliminate the offset under §23-4-2 which has been so
troublesome. Then there would be no problems with delay, complex hearings, and the need for statisticians to calculate the offset. Also the possibility of juries subjectively awarding higher
sums to overcome the offset would be obviated.
Other states have statutes that provide that where the
employer intentionally injures his employee, the employee must
elect between taking his workmen's compensation award or suing
at law.' This too has advantages over 523-4-2. If an employee
realizes that he waives the right to receive workmen's compensation benefits by suing at law he will be more reluctant to sue
at law. Under the present situation, the employee has nothing
to lose by suing his employer. If the new act were enacted the
risk would be much greater. Then the frivolous suits, especially
2n ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1310(d) (1977); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (Deering 1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-307 (West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 5 138.19 (Smith-

Hurd 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 28 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.120 (Vernon 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-7 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 97-12
(1965); OHIO CONST. Art. II § 34; S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); UTAH
CODE ANN. S 35-1-12 (1953); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.73 (West 1973).
See notes 56-69 supra and accompanying text.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 23-1022 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1979);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-11 (1978); TEX. REV. CIR. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon 1967).
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the slip and fall suits, would never be brought, and accordingly
the employer would be relieved from having to defend against
such suits. Thus the supreme court's holding in Mandolidis that
all intentional injury suits were questions of fact that must go
to the jury rather than having the court summarily dismiss them
would be indirectly overcome for the same reasons-the questionable suits would not be brought. Finally, the election statute
would also eliminate the need for the offset and all the problems
that come with it.
If West Virginia adopted either one of these statutes, the prospect of employer liability would be much improved, but still would
not be solved. The willful, wanton, and reckless standard would
still exist, juries would still not understand it, trial attorneys would
have no defense against it and juries would continue to find
employers liable for acts or ommissions that barely qualify as
negligence. The solution is to rewrite the statute to require specific
intent. If the language of the statute required specific intent, and
excluded gross negligence and recklessness, the supreme court
could not intelligently or honestly construe the statute to provide employer liability for other than a purposeful act.
At the time of this writing, there is a bill in the West Virginia
Legislature that would accomplish this objective if passed."5 Its
purpose is to negate the Mandolidis decision. The bill would require "a showing of an actual specific intent.""8 It redefines
deliberate intent as a "consciously, subjectively, and deliberately
formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death
to an employee."' This would completely do away with the willful,
wanton and reckless standard. It would therefore also do away
with the test of employer's awareness of a high degree of risk
to the employee as being sufficient to find the employer liable.
The legislature needs to pass this bill, otherwise the cost of doing business in West Virginia will continue to be prohibitive and
the future for industry in this state would be bleak.
David A. Mohler

Ohas. Gazette Feb. 11, 1982 S 5 at 5 Col. 4.
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